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Soviet crisis decision-making
and the Gorbachev reforms
JEFFREY W. LEGRO
All ofits [Warsaw Pact military doctrine's] provisions are designed for
the solution oftwo cardinal goals: first ofall, to prevent and avert both
a nuclear and conventional war; and, second, to provide socialism
with a reliable defence.
Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff. 2

Introduction
The Soviet Union led by President Mikhail Gorbachev has widely heralded the adoption of a new military doctrine which posits war prevention as its fundamental goal. Yet, as Akhromeyev acknowledges in the
above quote, a reliable defence, or preparation for war, is also essential.
What is not acknowledged, let alone resolved, is that the two desired goals
- prevention and preparation - may come into sharp conflict, especially in
a super-power crisis. Prevention of war may make it necessary to defer
actions which ready forces for battle or reduce their vulnerability. If war
appears likely, however, pressures will arise to initiate military preparations, if not operations. Yet if one side prepares, a spiral may start
which could end in an otherwise avoidable conflict or even a nuclear
exchange. 3 How will the USSR manage this dilemma?
The most thorough students of Soviet decisions in crises posit that policy
is largely determined by situational factors such as Soviet perceptions of the
balance of interest, the balance of military power, and the likely resolve of
the adversary. 4 However, it is also necessary to examine the institutions and
organizational procedures which influence the formation of these perceptions and their translation into policy. The USSR's current internal
restructuring suggests that a reappraisal of the domestic context of decisionmaking which will shape future Soviet behaviour is appropriate.
The Gorbachev era has promised to alter two distinguishing features of
traditional Soviet national security policy related to the use of force: the
offensive orientation of Soviet strategy and force posture; and the autonomous role of the military in strategic planning and threat assessment.
Under the 'new thinking', the USSR claims to have a defensive military
doctrine. Political means are stressed over military ones in the resolution
Jeffrey W. Legro is a doctoral candidate at UCLA and a Fellow at the RAND/UCLA
Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior. For 1988-9 he is a Ford
Foundation Fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA.I

339

of international disputes, and there are indications that the role of the
armed forces in formulating strategy will be decreased.
How will the proposed changes in military policy and institutional
arrangements affect Soviet choices on the use of force in a super-power
crisis in Europe? This question is important because it relates both to the
operational significance of the new thinking in military affairs and to
potential Soviet behaviour in an East-West clash. The following analysis
first appraises Soviet crisis decision-making under the 'old thinking' in
terms of: (i) the choices regarding the use of force which may confront
Kremlin leaders in a crisis; and (ii) the impact of political and military
authority on decisions. This analysis serves as a necessary base-line for
assessing Gorbachev's reforms and their effect on the trade-offs which the
USSR may have to make in a future confrontation.
The offence and traditional Soviet dilemmas
One trait of the USSR's security policy which is central to crisis decisions is
the offensive nature of its military strategy and force posture. Its war plans
have traditionally emphasized deep offensive operations based on seizing
the initiative, surprise, concentration of forces and mobility. Soviet force
posture has given this strategy credibility with a superior quantity of mobile
ground force systems. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact's strategy is based on
that of the USSR and, in the event of war, Eastern Bloc armies would be
integrated within the Soviet national command. NATO, on the other hand,
has a defensive posture without the decision-making structure, military
capabilities or doctrine which might provide incentives for a major offensive in a crisis. Other things being equal, this fundamental asymmetry
between NATO and the Pact leaves the Soviet leadership with the responsibility of the 'last clear chance' to avoid conflict.s
This responsibility is further heightened by the interaction of Soviet
and NATO military strategies, which threatens to lead to significant
escalation should war break out. Soviet military strategy has stressed
offensive air and ground operations aimed at achieving victory by disrupting the enemy's rear and preventing a coherent defence, especially by
striking at his command and control and nuclear systems. 6 NATO's Flexible Response strategy calls for the first use of nuclear weapons if it is
unable to defend successfully with conventional means. Success for Soviet
plans would entail near total pre-emption of NATO nuclear capabilities;
NATO's anticipation of this gives its leaders an incentive for early dispersal
of forces. Yet, the Soviet ability to carry out pre-emption is lessened after
NATO dispersal has occurred, giving the USSR an incentive to strike early.
This synergism creates pressure for a quick decision regarding the use of
force, while also raising the stakes of such a choice.
This general context of the USSR's prevention/preparation dilemma
serves as a back-drop for specific types of trade-offs which Soviet leaders
may have to confront in a conflict. Four issues are outlined below which
Soviet academic and military analyses indicate could demand a particu-
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larly difficult choice between competing goals related to the use of force
and nuclear weapons.
DIPLOMACY VERSUS SHOW OF FORCE

A first area of difficult choices involves the relative weight of political and
military means to resolve a confrontation. The importance of political
means is a constant theme in Soviet analyses of past super-power clashes.
The Arab-Israeli 1973 October War is depicted as a successful example of
the US and USSR working together to prevent a conflict from escalating. 7
Similarly, political commentator Fedor Burlatskii portrays compromise
and President Kennedy's foregoing nuclear diplomacy as essential to the
resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 8
While Soviet writings give negotiation priority in the resolution of
crises, 'use of the military instrument' also occupies an important place.
Authors tend to view the USSR's warfighting might as crucial for inhibiting 'imperialists' from starting wars or using nuclear weapons.9 For
example, during the 1961 Berlin Crisis the Soviet resumption of nuclear
testing and the dispatch of tanks to confront Western forces at the border
are described as cooling 'hotheads' in the US, and forcing the West to get
used to a 'new state of affairs in Berlin'.10
Diplomatic and military means are are not considered equal 'tools' in
terms of risk, however. This is where the decision-making dilemma arises.
Military means may be useful for crisis leverage, but they risk the costs of
undesired escalation. M.A. Gareyev, now a Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, has noted the difficulty of returning to peacetime once military units
have been deployed. 11 The notion that it is hard to determine where a particular show of force will lead may have been reinforced when, following
the manipulation of Soviet airborne alerts during the 1973 October War,
the US moved its nuclear alert levels to DEFCON III. 12
SHOW OF FORCE VERSUS MILITARY SURPRISE

A second related dilemma involves a possible choice between threats or
shows of force which might limit a crisis by demonstrating resolve, and a
desire for surprise should military action be deemed necessary. Soviet military thought places a high premium on surprise. 13 Maskirovka (deception)
is often cited as an essential element in catching the opponent unprepared.
It misleads the enemy as to intention, and, should hostilities erupt, might
provide a crucial advantage. 14 At the same time, a show, or limited use of
force is considered a useful crisis management tool.
A display of force to indicate resolve in the hope of avoiding large-scale
conflict, however, may counteract the maintenance of normal operating
procedures useful for gaining strategic surprise. 15 The USSR has rarely, if
ever, alerted its strategic forces in a crisis. 16 Is this due to a desire to avoid
nuclear war, or to maintain the possibility of surprise, or both? 17 Whether
or not strategic deception might be pursued would probably depend on
the perceived probability of war and the interests at stake in a given
situation.
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CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT VERSUS PRE-EMPTION OR FIRST STRIKE IN
A NUCLEAR WAR

A third apparent conflict of objectives could arise if a political confrontation were to develop into an armed clash. The emergence of a belief in
the Soviet Union that a super-power conflict could be limited to conventional operations has received considerable attention. 18 Strictly conventional operations are desirable because nuclear weapons complicate
ground force operations, and entail the risk of a major exchange which
could destroy the Soviet homeland. But while military writings reveal a
preference for conventional warfare, they also emphasize the importance
of the first large-scale, if not pre-emptive, use of nuclear weapons. The
initial massive attack is seen as having the ability to cause heavy losses,
disrupt operations in the rear, and put the survival of a nation in jeopardy.
In short, it could decide the course of the war.19
The dilemma faced by Soviet leaders is that the destructive and operational consequences of nuclear war make the choice to use nuclear
weapons a difficult one early in a conflict,20 yet if they wait too long they
risk missing the opportunity to use a pre-emptive strike to minimize damage to their own forces. Such a delay might even lead to eventual defeat. 21
The solution appears to lie in anticipating when the enemy is going to
launch a nuclear attack. Exactly how this can be foreseen is somewhat
vague in the literature. One author remarks that preparations would give
the launch away, but he admits that in modem times such a warning
would be more difficult to detect. Nonetheless, 'it is not very probable that
the aggressor would start a war without any preparations whatsoever',
implying that enemy movement would be the major indicator. 22 The
problem with this solution, and the crux of the dilemma, is that in a crisis
many precautionary moves taken by the West (i.e., movements of troops
and ships, surges in communication signals, and dispersal of weapons)
might resemble preparation to launch an attack.
FIRM CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS VERSUS TIMELY USE

A fourth decision involving competing goals in a crisis relates to command, control and use of nuclear weapons. The USSR places great stress
on firm civilian command and control, especially in the area of nuclear
armaments, 23 yet timely action is also a highly-valued principle, one that
has gained importance in recent Soviet writings. 24
Firm control of military forces, especially nuclear weapons, may hamper
effective use in a timely fashion, but, if the past is an indicator, Soviet planners will opt for control. It appears that in a super-power clash Soviet
nuclear force alert levels have not been raised. In fact, if anything, Soviet
crisis experiences have taught the need to value control. Recent information suggests that one of the most dangerous actions of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the shooting down of an American U-2, was carried out by a
local Soviet commander on his own authority.2 5 Indeed, in Soviet writings
the rise of inadvertence as the primary path to nuclear war may suggest an
even stronger preference by the leadership for firm control. 26
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Political and military authority in crisis decision-making
Although many factors will play a role in the resolution of these dilemmas,
the relative weight of political and military authority could be a critical factor. The decision-making process itself can be significant because of the
often uncertain environment of crises which allows for different interpretations (and the biases that motivate them) of events. The civil-military
relationship only matters for decision-making to the extent that the views of
politicians and soldiers differ, and to the degree that each has a say in
decisions. A common view of Soviet decision-making is that political and
military views do not conflict, and, when they do, political authority
dominates. 27 While this view is in many respects correct, it may need
qualification, particularly in crises. Political and military preferences may
clash over certain issues, with the military having an important influence
on decisions due to its near monopoly of strategic planning and threat
assessment.
TENSIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY PERSPECTIVES

The potential for a clash of perspectives is seen in the two distinct levels
which comprise Soviet military doctrine. The socio-political level considers the nature, objectives and initiation of war. This level is controlled
by the political leadership and is considered dominant. The militarytechnical level deals with issues of military strategy, science and operations and is considered the realm of military professionals. 2s The two
levels reflect the dichotomy between prevention of and preparation for
war. 29 In peacetime, the two need not clash, yet in a crisis the trade-offs
between them are likely to be more intense.
Evidence of tensions between political doctrine and parts of the military
literature has involved a number of topics related to a future conflict,
including victory in a nuclear war, first use of nuclear weapons, and the
weighing of political and military means in a crisis. Brezhnev's 1977 Tula
speech touched off a new phase in the evolution of the socio-political level
of military doctrine when he declared that the USSR does not seek military superiority. This initiative eventually evolved into an official denial
that victory is possible in a nuclear war and a 'no-first-use' pledge. Military
writers, however, have expressed contrary views.3o The USSR's no-firstuse pledge seems at odds with the heavy emphasis that the first use of
nuclear weapons has received in the military literature.
In terms of specific crisis decisions, military authors express concern
that prevention may be given priority over preparation. The historical
analogy used is Stalin's choices at the beginning of World War II when 'the
political measures that were taken to avoid war were not correctly linked
with concern over maintaining the armed forces at a high state of vigilance
and combat readiness.'31 The author argues that political and military
methods need to be combined, and rejects the idea that preparation hurts
prevention. He clearly implies that, should the two come into conflict,
preparation must come first. 32 Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has argued that
the military should be given more command authority in peacetime to
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allow for a timely response in crises. The political leadership may disagree
with his priority of timely response over firm control, and Dale Herspring
speculates that this was a reason for Ogarkov's ouster. 33
Differences between political and military preferences should not be
blown out of proportion and, in print at least, are more the exception than
the rule. It is too simplistic to equate civilians exclusively with the emphasis that the socio-political level of doctrine places on prevention, and
military men with the offensive-preparation orientation of the militarytechnical level. One should note, however, the existence of specific institutional values, and the degree to which these affect decision-making. By
Soviet accounts, the Red Army has been the physical and ideological
repository of the armed offensive since the Revolution,3 4 with the defence
of the country as its raison d'etre. Because the military plays a crucial role
in assessing threats, formulating options and implementing policy, this
offensive bias could have an important influence, particularly when
enemy action is vague and decision-making time constrained.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITY IN CRISIS DECISION-MAKING

Research on Soviet civil-military relations clearly highlights the dominance of political authority. 35 Historically, the Politburo has ousted generals, never the reverse. Even in conflict situations, political authority
has reigned supreme, be it Stalin in World War II or Khrushchev during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is not an issue contested by the armed
forces - as military writers have pointed out, political aspects can dominate military ones even in war. 36 Especially concerning release authority
for nuclear weapons, civilian authority is undoubtedly decisive. 37
Nonetheless, the military retains a certain autonomy that allows it
implicit authority. Condoleezza Rice has termed this relationship 'loose
coupling', a system whereby the political leadership sets the guidelines of
policy and has final authority, but the military has responsibility for option
formulation and implementation.3s This responsibility is one reason why
professional soldiers can have a significant implicit influence. In addition,
the nature of the crisis situation, because the threat of conflict is involved,
gives the military increased access to policy.
This is not to argue that the military dominates decisions in crises. In
fact, because of the significance of such choices, politicians can be
expected to be intimately involved. And when political and military viewpoints explictly clash, the politician's voice will be decisive. But the military will play a key role in defining the situation - what the nature of the
threat is, what the feasible military alternatives are, and how they should
be implemented. Thus, to the extent that military perspectives diverge
from political ones, they could affect Soviet behaviour.

Military monopoly
A distinguishing feature of Soviet national security decision-making is the
armed forces' traditional monopoly of military expertise.39 There have
generally been no significant alternative sources of analysis on security
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matters. For example, there is no Central Committee department which
covers the issues handled by the General Staff or the Defence Ministry. In
the US, there is a civilian structure in the form of the Office of the Secretary of Defense which parallels the military command. 40 In addition,
the US defence establishment makes use of civilian institutes, such as the
RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis, which do
extensive research on military affairs. Soviet research institutes have not
in the past had the expertise or access to data on military issues, and the
Soviet leadership has had virtually nowhere else to tum for strategic
assessment except to the General Staff. 4 1
The military jealously guards this monopoly from intrusions by other
institutions, cloaking details of its policy in secrecy. At the SALT I talks,
Soviet officers reportedly did not want military matters discussed even in
front of the USSR's civilian officials.42 Authors from Soviet research institutes such as the Institute for World Economy and International
Relations or the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada must rely
on Western sources of military information for their work, and, until
recently, never wrote about the military-technical side of doctrine. 43 Military studies are taught exclusively in military academies to armed forces
personnel. Both in experience and structure, there has traditionally been
little military expertise at the civilian staff level.
This exclusiveness is important because military matters can alter political objectives. Gen.-Col. Povaly has argued that the aim of war must
correspond to strategic capabilities, concepts and planning, which may
require the changing of political objectives even in a conflict. 44 Although
the KGB obviously plays a role in foreign intelligence assessment, it is the
General Staff, and its intelligence branch, the GRU, that largely controls
and assesses the information on strategic capabilities, planning and military threats. That this information can exercise leverage on political
decisions is evident in the realm of budget decisions. Khrushchev
remarked to Eisenhower in 1959 that the military was able to lay claim to
additional resources, despite political preferences, by predicting inferiority if the funds were not allocated. 4s Although budgetary politics are
certainly different to conflict decisions, this anecdote is suggestive of the
way in which the military's authority might allow institutional biases to
shape policy. 46

Military access in crises
The potential adaptation of the Soviet leadership structure for the purposes
of managing a conflict may increase military access and influence. In World
War II the State Defence Committee (GKO) assumed supreme command of
the country. The present day Defence Council is thought to be the GKO's
analogue, and would serve as the transitional command organization
between peace and war. Thus, it is probably the locus of crisis decisionmaking. 47 While the Defence Council's exact composition is unknown, it
is clear that military officials play a key role in its operations. At a minimum, the General Staff acts as a secretariat and in so doing is able to
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'shape both the agenda and the decisions in ways consistent with their own
personal and institutional preferences.'48 At a maximum, military officials
may serve directly as members. In principle, the military's access to
decision-making, given its expertise and control of strategic information,
means that its preference for preparation could bias policy in that direction.
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF PREVENTION/PREPARATION CHOICES

The historical record on this issue, to the extent that it is known, however,
may suggest exactly the opposite. Military men appear to have been hesitant, and political leaders - especially Khrushchev - belligerent in
crises. 49 For example, there seems to have been a division in the leadership
over Berlin, with many feeling that the USSR was not ready for a largescale war. The spy Oleg Penkovsky asserted that many generals wondered why Berlin was worth such risks. 50 The decision to put missiles in
Cuba was reportedly made exclusively by the political leadership. It has
been suggested that Deputy Minister of Defence and Commander-inChief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Marshal K.S. Moskalenko was
replaced by Marshal S.S. Biryuzov because of the farmer's resistance to
the plan.s 1
Despite this record, there are at least two arguments why it may not
hold true in a future confrontation in Europe (assuming, of course, that
old thinking continues to dominate military policy). First, the nature of
emerging technologies, which increases the accuracy, range and destructive power of even conventional weapons, makes institutions and the
opinions of top military personnel even more important. When decisionmaking time is short, and the situation during a crisis uncertain, standard operating procedures institutionalized in peacetime could constrain or determine options in crises. One example which may be
relevant is the Soviet downing of the Korean Air Lines plane on 1 September 1983, purportedly carried out without the senior leadership being
consulted.s2 In addition, the degree and nature of military influence may
depend on the views and relative power of the military man at the top at
any given time. A crisis situation involving a minister of defence who
believes strongly in pre-emption and has the influence that Marshal
Grechko had in 1975 could lead to more assertive military behaviour.
A second consideration bearing on soldiers' attitudes towards the use of
force is the military balance. At the time of the Berlin and Cuban crises,
the US had superiority in terms of capabilities for a general nuclear war,
which is what Soviet military doctrine expected to result from any clash.
Military leaders were most familiar with the potential consequences of
this inferiority, and it is not surprising that they were wary of a major confrontation. Today, Soviet military thought allows for the possibility of an
extended confrontation.s3 This change, given Soviet parity at the nuclear
level and potential superiority at the conventional level in Central Europe,
means that the likely outcome of a conflict may be much more favourable
to the USSR, especially- in the military's eyes at least- if the traditionally
preferred surprise offensive is implemented.
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The offensive, military authority and the Gorbachev era
Gorbachev's new thinking is directly relevant to Soviet choices regarding
the use of force because it has promised to change the two features of the
USSR's national security structure highlighted above: the offensive orientation of the Soviet force posture and strategy, and the important
implicit role of the professional military in national security decisions.
How has the new thinking affected these two characteristics?
DECLINE OF THE OFFENSIVE?
Soviet military policy is clearly in a transitional phase, but identifying new
developments and judging their significance is more complex. A useful
way to disaggregate change in military policy is in terms of concepts, force
structure and operational strategy. 'Concepts' refers to declaratory policy
on the role and nature of Soviet armed forces. 'Force structure' is the
physical characteristics of the military. 'Operational strategy' concerns the
methods for employing military forces. In addition to identifying change,
the impact of any differences must also be addressed. The central issue is
whether the current Soviet offensive strategy will evolve in a way that is
less threatening to the West and more conducive to crisis stability. This
threat can be judged with regard to Soviet capabilities and incentives in
three scenarios: (i) a short-warning attack with available ready forces
located in Eastern Europe; (ii) a limited-mobilization attack which adds
near-ready forces located in the USSR's Western Military Districts that
would require some manpower and preparation; and (iii) a full-scale
mobilized attack, which in addition to ready and near-ready forces would
include cadre units in the USSR that need extensive manning and training. A review of political and military views and actions will better clarify
the nature of modifications in the Soviet offensive.

Political views and the new doctrine
Gorbachev has sought to redefine the Soviet attitude towards security
matters. New thinking declares that political means will now be dominant
over military ones in resolving problems in the international arena; prevention of war is the guiding theme of Soviet military policy, and, most
important for this analysis, military doctrine is now defensive.s4 Civilian
analysts have responded by offering ideas that would entail significant
change in the current offensive strategy and capabilities. New proposals
have included: calls for unilateral reductions; the need to extend the
defensive orientation of doctrine into the realm of force structure, strategy
and tactics; adjustments in military forces and exercises; and a liquidation
of the forces intended for conducting deep offensive operations.ss
Gorbachev added meat to the bones of this conceptual framework with
his December 1988 UN pledge to reduce unilaterally Soviet forces aimed
at NATO.s6 Given current strategy and force structure, this reduction
would detract from Soviet capabilities to launch a standing-start attack
against the West. Highly mobile fire-power such as tanks are allegedly
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going to be replaced by stationary defence-oriented equipment such as
anti-tank, air defence and engineering systems.57
Gorbachev's motives appear to be linked to his efforts to reinvigorate
the failing Soviet economy. The new thinking in security affairs is driven
by a desire to ameliorate tensions and competition in the international
arena, thereby allowing future defence resources to be diverted to modernization of the USSR's technological and industrial base. Internally, the
new doctrine allows Gorbachev to gain control over the national security
agenda (and its budgetary implications), which would otherwise be dominated by traditional thinking and interests.ss
Military views and the new doctrine
At a general level, military officials voice agreement with the new concepts, and indicate that Soviet military policy is changing. Leading Soviet generals have declared that military doctrine is now defensive, with
prevention of war as its main priority. Furthermore, it is explicitly stated
that these changes will be reflected at the military-technical level of doctrine in terms of modified organizational structure and strategies. For
example, Gen. Gareyev states that the new doctrine has led to revisions in
military manuals, academic programmes at military institutions and combat training, with a strong focus on defence. 59 Army Gen. Moiseyev, the
new Chief of the General Staff, notes that military theoreticians have not
paid adequate attention to defensive combat actions in the past, and calls
for more attention in this area. 60
However, some military writings seem to diverge from political themes
when the specifics of doctrine are discussed. 61 For example, although the
Pact has officially adopted a defensive doctrine, military authors agree
that this does not rule out counter-offensives, even if they are 'decisive'
and destroy, rather than just repel, the enemy. 62 Head of the Air Defence
Forces, Army Gen. Tret'yak, logically claims that it is impossible to tum
back an attack without counter-offensive operations. 63 Nonetheless, if
sufficient offensive capabilities are required to take the battle to the
enemy's territory and rout him, a case could be made for retaining the present posture. A sceptic might wonder how Soviet military requirements
will be different from the early 70s, when it was recognized that: 'In some
conditions the enemy invasion must be repelled before the initiation of
the offensive.'64 In fact, the restructuring of Soviet forces as announced by
Gorbachev would lend a more defensive cast to forces deployed in Eastern
Europe, but would leave significant offensive potential in the Western
Military Districts of the USSR.
The military does have interests in defence, but they may differ from
those of the new thinking because they pre-date Gorbachev's leadership.
Professional soldiers have noted that the development of new conventional
capabilities would blur the lines between offence and defence, since they
allow the defender to defeat the attacker's preparations before the invasion
is ever carried out. There is concern that new NATO technologies of the
future might threaten the viability of the Soviet offensive force structure
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and strategy.6s More specifically, it is feared that the deep-strike strategies,
such as NATO's Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), backed up by highly accurate munitions, would thwart Soviet plans based on the effective movement of second echelon forces into the forward battle area. 66 The main
objective of professional soldiers in the current reformulation of doctrine is
not specifically to prevent war by adopting a defensive strategy, but instead
to defend against emerging threats to current strategy.
The Soviet military's focus on an effective, rather than strictly 'defensive', operational strategy is reflected in writings which attempt to clarify
the meaning of the new thinking in security affairs at the militarytechnical level of doctrine. Unlike political statements and Gorbachev's
reduction plan, these writings indicate that not all aspects of the evolving
Soviet military policy will necessarily be positive for crisis stability and
Western security. This idea is supported by a review of discussions of four
crucial topics: the future of the offence in Soviet strategy; the nature of
defensive operations; the new force structure; and force readiness.
First, although in Soviet doctrine defence is now officially considered
the dominant form of operations, the offence continues to occupy the
place of honour at the military-technical level. Military officials
emphasize the need for counter-offensives that seem equal in scale to
offensive operations under the old thinking. The new attention given to
defence could lead to an enhanced ability to conduct defensive operations
(e.g., reducing vulnerability to FOFA attacks), while retaining a deep attack
potential. One article suggests that to correct for past negligence of defensive capabilities the percentage of exercises practising defence should be
'far higher than it is now'. A fifty-fifty ratio is recommended as the designated target for training in operations in attack and defence, 67 indicating
that offensive abilities will not be neglected.
The nature of future 'defensive operations' may also be more threatening
than the phrase suggests. The general concept of defence in Soviet military
thought is seen as a way to create both superiority over an adversary and the
conditions to shift to the offence. 68 Akhromeyev and Moiseyev have
emphasized that the new strategy will be an active, aggressive defence
which does not entirely cede the initiative to the aggressor. 69 In the Soviet
Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 'defence activeness' (aktivnost' oborony)
includes 'hitting the adversary with airstrikes and artillery fire during the
time the adversary is preparing for an attack.' 70 Indeed, Soviet commentaries have reportedly stated that new technologies allow the defence to
take the initiative and defeat an offensive before it is launched. 71 Such a
'defensive' concept ailows for pre-emption and could lead to escalation
should NATO precautionary actions be misinterpreted as preparation for
attack. Of course, 'allowing for' pre-emption is different from earlier
writings where it is portrayed as a crucial element of military success.
Gorbachev's UN speech promises that the USSR will have fewer forces
facing the West, but accompanying changes in the concepts for employing
these forces will represent a continuing concern for NATO. First, as
Gareyev has stated, the less the quantity of Soviet forces, the greater the
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importance of creating highly mobile reserves for rapid manoeuvres. 72
Such mobility, however, represents a threat because it could be used to
move forces from the rear to the front and concentrate them rapidly, particularly in a limited-mobilization attack. Second, Gen. Yazov has written that Soviet military policy will emphasize quality rather than quantity, including a more efficient organizational structure and better
trained troops. 73 Again, a leaner, meaner- and more mobile - Soviet army
will not necessarily reduce the threat.
A final theme of the new doctrine which merits attention is force readiness. High-level officials note that the defensive orientation of Soviet
doctrine concedes the initiation of conflict to the enemy, thus demanding
an increase in the readiness of troops so as to compensate for this
disadvantage. 74 Since even after Gorbachev's cuts the USSR will retain
advantages in important categories of weapons (e.g., artillery) in the forward area, an increase in readiness levels, especially if units in the Western Military Districts are included, may reinforce the image of a loaded
spring which might easily be released in a crisis. Even more troubling are
Moiseyev's statements that not only combat readiness, but also mobilization readiness should be improved. Given the present Soviet advantages in this area, such an improvement would make a mobilized attack
even more of a challenge to Western security. This development, in conjunction with the others mentioned above, indicates that not all changes
in operational strategy will prove to be less threatening to NATO.
DECLINE OF THE MILITARY MONOPOLY?

Gorbachev's leadership also promises to weaken military control ofwarmaking expertise and information. In the realm of expertise, civilians
appear to be playing a greater role in military analysis. A new programme
is being set up in 'political-military affairs' which is apparently aimed at
educating think-tank academics in military studies.1s Civilian authors are
now writing on topics previously covered only by professional soldiers. 76
There were rumours that a new section for threat analysis would be established in the International Department under the now retired A.
Dobrynin. 77 Military officers who are alumni of Gen. Chervov's armscontrol directorate of the General Staff are working in various government departments, including the Central Committee and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs' arms-control and policy-planning departments. 1s The
Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against Nuclear War is a
civilian organization which has influenced Soviet arms-control and security policy by participating in the Soviet response to the US Strategic
Defense Initiative and conventional arms control. 79
Soviet civilian analysts are also pressing the military to release more
information concerning military doctrine and the size and composition of
the armed forces. One senior analyst and official, Georgi Arbatov, has
argued that military secrecy began in the 1930s (during the period of
Stalin's 'deviation'), and is not a normal part of socialism. He states that in
Lenin's time military affairs were discussed openly, which actually
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enhanced, rather than harmed, Soviet defence capability. This openness, he
contends, 'strengthened the political positions of the [USSR] by not making
it divert excessive amounts of limited resources to military needs, and it
helped our state avoid major mistakes in diplomacy and military affairs. '80
More important than the desires of these institutchiki are the apparent
intentions of the leadership. Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard
Shevardnadze declared in a major speech in July 1988 that all departments engaged in military activity should come under the control of a
higher authority. He specifically called for an increase in the flow of information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that developments in
defence matters could be assessed in terms of their correspondence to
international agreements and political positions. Shevardnadze notes
that, in the past, the military sphere was not under 'democratic control'. 81
The USSR is apparently going to establish a Commission on Military
Affairs in the new Soviet parliament which will oversee the activities of
the Ministry of Defence. 82
It is likely that professional soldiers are not entirely happy about all the
changes and, at least in their writings, are fighting back. Military officials
acknowledge the need to listen to proposals from different groups, including troops, veterans and civilians. Yet, when specific notions are discussed an attitude of non-tolerance is apparent. For example, Moiseyev
has criticized 'non-competent' articles that question the military threat
and the defensive measures being taken to meet it. 83 Gareyev maintains
that military science is a separate social science discipline requiring
specific skills and experience. He cites M.V. Frunze's criticism of the
'Trotskyites', who did not believe there was a need for any separate
science. 84 This analogy may reflect a military belief that issues related to
the use of force should be left to those who pursue them as a career - the
officers of the armed forces. As one Soviet civilian resentfully stated 'They
[professional soldiers] think they are the only ones who understand military matters.' 85 For the time-being, the military appears to be reacting
slowly to the call for glasnost, yet the political handwriting is on the wall:
under Gorbachev the armed forces will become increasingly pressured to
explain positions and share information with other governmental
organizations. 86 In the realm of policy, Gorbachev's force reduction plan
was reportedly one of the first times that civilian analysts participated
actively in discussions on strategy and force structure. 87
The impact of the new thinking on Soviet crisis decision-making
The impact of Gorbachev's innovations in national security policy can be
evaluated with respect to the aspects of conflict decision-making developed above. The assumption in the following sections is that the USSR's
plans to reduce its forces will be carried out as indicated. It is thus necessarily speculative because it refers to the context of decision-making two
years hence, rather than the present situation.
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THE OFFENCE AND TRADITIONAL DILEMMAS
The influence of the new thinking on the Soviet penchant for the offensive
shows varying results in the areas of concepts, force structure and operational strategy. In terms of concepts, both political and military leaders
have recognized the importance of paying more attention to defence,
albeit for different reasons. The West should welcome this declaratory
line, yet what ultimately matters is its effect on force structure and strategy. Announced Warsaw Pact reductions, if implemented as indicated,
will significantly limit the ability of the East to launch a successful
standing-start attack. In terms of a limited or full-scale mobilization
attack, however, the Soviet Union will retain powerful capabilities. Discussions of operational strategy reveal similar mixed trends. The Soviet
military is paying more attention to defensive operations and the skills
such missions would require, but the theatre offensive is still seen as the
path to success in a conflict, and the problem of effectively bringing the
powerful second echelon forces located in the Western part of the USSR to
bear in a 'counter-offensive' is being carefully studied.
There have been modifications in traditional Soviet military thinking
and planning which could have consequences for crisis decision-making.
Most important, leaders will have more options than the 'use them or lose
them' offensive. If Soviet declaratory statements about restructuring hold
true, the USSR will also have capabilities to react defensively should war
break out. Thus, NATO precautionary moves need not automatically
unleash a Soviet offensive. Given a reduction of Soviet and Warsaw Pact
forces, a short-warning attack in a crisis where mobilization has not
occurred would be extremely unlikely.
What will not be changed, however, is the Soviet capability to
implement a substantial limited and full-scale mobilized attack. Any preparations which bring Category II and III troops up to strength and heading west would represent a significant threat and dilemma for NATO.
What would the West do if the USSR were to prepare and move forces forward without initiating hostilities? The tension between NATO's FOFA
strategy, aimed at interdicting the forward movement of troops, and its
defensive nature would be sorely tested. Thus, while indicated Soviet
changes in military policy would improve crisis stability in a short confrontation, there might be greater instability in the realm of reinforcement. A significant Soviet improvement in mobilization could affect the
balance of forces decisively. There would be pressures on both to start
reinforcement at the first sign of rear area preparations. Such a dynamic,
as in World War I, could be tantamount to war.
SPECIFIC DILEMMAS

Political versus military means
The new thinking will not eliminate the difficult choices facing the USSR,
but it could lessen the escalatory potential of certain types of Soviet military diplomacy. For example, to the extent that Soviet strategy is not
dependent upon rapid deep offensive action in the initial period of war,
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Soviet shows of force or precautionary military moves in the forward area
(which do not involve mobilization) might be less threatening to the West
and, thus, less likely to lead to an undesired escalatory spiral.

Show offorce versus military surprise
This dilemma would be ameliorated if seizing the initiative and strategic
surprise were to become a lower priority in Soviet strategy. Comments by
Akhromeyev and others have suggested that the USSR plans to remain on
the defensive for three weeks after the initiation of conflict.88 If the Soviet
Union is thus prepared to forego a surprise offensive, it may be more
willing to demonstrate resolve through a show of force.

Conventional preference versus first nuclear use
A Soviet military posture that is better suited to defend against an attack,
particularly by reducing the vulnerability of its forces to modem conventional and nuclear weapons, would be less pressured to pre-empt enemy
systems so as to minimize damage. This is not to say that once war appears
imminent, pre-emption would not be a desired option. However, in crises
where the adversary is taking precautions, but his intentions are unclear,
the Soviet leadership will have the option and greater confidence that
assuming the defensive will not mean defeat.

Firm control versus timely use
To the extent that Soviet strategy is not dependent upon an early strike at
NATO's aircraft, nuclear depots and equipment at POMCUS sites before
precautionary dispersal, Soviet leaders would be more likely to exercise
their preference for firm control of forces, as pressure for early use would
be lessened. Tensions between the two aims, of course, remain.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITY IN CRISES
Under Gorbachev, the military's authority has been weakened in the two
areas of expertise and information where it has traditionally maintained a
near monopoly. Civilians have been encouraged to contribute to debates
on strategy, force structure and threat assessment. The armed forces are
under pressure to release more data on the size and structure of military
forces, especially to other government entities such as the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Academy of Sciences. Increasingly, the military is
having to defend its traditional position in public fora. Soldiers will continue to have considerable input into decisions involving military use;
what is different is that control over war plans and procedures in peacetime are being driven by political priorities that have channelled the
military's budding interest in defence into significant modifications in
force structure, which in tum require changes in operational strategy.

Conclusion
In short, Gorbachev's reforms do have implications for Soviet conflict
decision-making. As the works of Hannes Adomeit and others have
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pointed out, Soviet perceptions of the balance, the interests at stake, and
the relative resolve in a specific situation will obviously be important. Yet
how these perceptions are formed can be influenced by institutional
arrangements and decision-making procedures. Under the old thinking,
the strong offensive nature of the USSR's planning and force structure
and the important implicit role of the military in decision-making could
constrain the way Soviet leaders perceive the military threat in crises and
the plausible options at hand, thus biasing choices towards preparation.
Under the new thinking, at least front-line defensive operational capabilities are to be strengthened at the expense of offensive potential. In
addition, Soviet military theory and threat assessment have been opened
to input from a wider spectrum of interests. As a result, leaders will have
options in crises other than the rapid shock offensive. This is not to say
that the USSR would never use force or launch an attack; it retains
significant capabilities for a mobilized offensive that could significantly
threaten Western security. Thus, as the unreinforced short-warning attack
becomes less likely with the implementation of Gorbachev's reductions,
the military threat to NATO will become increasingly linked to the magnitude and efficiency of Soviet mobilization.
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